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The popularity of smart phones has risen throughout the years since first introduced.
With the popularity of the devices growing so too has the number of malicious applications
flooding the devices’ marketplaces. With more usage there becomes a larger target for
malware and exploitation creation. As threats to these devices continue to grow there is
a constant need for security to safeguard against these threats. Some attempts to protect
smart phones involve building software to analyze applications running on the devices.
This attempt has cut back on the amount of malicious software on the marketplace. These
attempts however only catch malicious applications after they have been running.
This dissertation presents the Secure Android Development Model. The goal of this
model is to contribute to security of these devices by having a development model that
implicitly builds security into applications. The model ensures a minimal amount of open
permissions thus limiting the number of attack vectors that malicious software can make

on the devices. By following the model, developers will have all information available
during development to make appropriate security decisions in their applications.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Smartphones have become more widely used with more than half (56%) of US citizens using smartphones[27]. Standard cellular phones (cell phones) were used for making
phone calls and sending Short Message Service (SMS) messages. As such, standard cell
phones provided little multimedia capabilities. Smartphones are designed as multimedia
devices with the ability to read email, read and write documents, and browse the Internet. The emphasis on phones being used for multimedia purposes has made smartphones
a more central part of people’s days.
Smartphones are used more and more by individuals and companies as ways to stay
connected to each other. Smartphones have grown in popularity making application development more mainstream. Increased application development leads to apps for the devices
that make storing, retrieving, and sharing information easy to accomplish. With the ease of
information sharing, smartphones make it that much easier to stay connected for business
and personal use.[27]
The growth in usage has led to growth in malicious software being written to target the
increased user base. Security of these devices is a growing concern and many attempts at
securing them have been made[2, 4, 7, 8, 15, 23, 29, 32]. Most attempts focus on fixing a
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problem with the operating system (OS) or finding running malware and removing it. This
dissertation proposes a model for software development for the Android operating system
that will implicitly build security into new applications developed attempting to minimize
the risk of these applications being exploited by malicious software on the devices. The
goal is to build the protection into the applications to prevent misuse, rather than detect the
misuse and remove it.
This chapter will define what smartphones and mobile devices are and will discuss how
malware is written for these devices. It will then introduce the hypothesis and contribution
of this dissertation.

1.1

Smartphones and Mobile Devices
Smartphones differ from standard cell phones in that they provide additional function-

ality. A cell phone’s primary functionality is to send and receive phone calls and text
messages. ”Smartphone” is the term given to a device that is still a cell phone, but more
emphasis is placed on the device’s additional functionality. Smartphones are designed to
be portable media centers in addition to being a phone.
Internet usage and email reading were early marketing points for smartphones. With
Internet capabilities, these devices became more like personal computers. These devices
are easy to use and can store a user’s personal documents to be read and used at any time.
The convenience that smartphones allow has led to growth in their usage over the years
and smartphones are now used by more than half of American adults[27].
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Attempts at building these Swiss Army Knife devices began as early as 1993 with the
IBM Simon[26]. In addition to being a cell phone, the device also acted as a Personal
Digital Assistant (PDA) and as a mobile fax machine (it could send digital documents to
other fax machines). This phone was expensive at $899 and was extremely cumbersome.
Palm Inc. introduced the Palm Pilot in 1996. The Palm Pilot was not a mobile phone
but it was a mobile PDA. This device became commonly used to store documents and sync
calendars. The device was light and inexpensive, thus it caught on more quickly than other
devices of the time.
Additional progress was halted until around 2002 when Research In Motion developed
the Black Berry. This device was the first commercial success of combining a Palm Pilot
with a mobile phone. This device had Internet and email capabilities in addition to being
a phone. The Blackberry was mostly used for businesses and large enterprises. This made
the device reside solely within a niche market.
The first success of non business acceptance of smartphones came in 2007 when Apple
released the iPhone. Apple combined all of their multi-media features present in their iPods
with a mobile phone. These devices could browse the Internet, check email, play movies
and music, read and write documents, take video and pictures, and play games. These
devices were marketed for personal use compared to Blackberry’s market of business use.
Shortly after release of the iPhone, Google released its new mobile device operating system
Android. This gave Apple its competition in the same personal use market for smartphones.
These two companies successfully marketed the idea of a smartphone to home users and
use of these devices has been increasing ever since.
3

Today, users have access to many different models of iPhone, many different models
running Android OS, and now Microsoft has a mobile Windows OS for smartphones in
the market as well. Smartphones have become so ubiquitous that these companies have
even started taking the idea of a smartphone and putting it on larger devices giving us our
mobile tablets. Apple has several versions of the iPad and many different Android based
tablets exist. E-readers such as Nook Color and the Kindle Fire run their own version of
Android. In addition to smartphones, these other mobile devices have many of the same
features. This also means that they have many of the same flaws. All of these devices have
security issues and the more widespread use they gain, the more they become the targets
of malicious software.
The growing threats to these devices warrant an increased effort in protecting them.
Security models need to be developed and updated to react to the growing problems facing
these devices.

1.2

Built in SmartPhone Security
One way to secure a computer is to limit the privileges of the user. When a user acquires

a new smartphone, the policy in place is to not allow the user to have root level access. User
level access is granted by the OS to prevent the user of the device from having complete
control of it. This is done as a form of security by having the user require permission from
the OS to install new applications instead of being able to install anything the user wishes.
Several techniques exist to give system level access of the smartphone to the user.
These techniques are referred to as jailbreaking or rooting the device. This technique is
4

accomplished by exploiting different bugs in the system to flash a hacked version of the
OS onto the device. This new version of the OS does not have the permission blocks that
prevent root access to the user. The majority of users do not ”jailbreak” their phones and
leave the normal OS installed.
Companies, such as Google and Apple, rely on the restricted access to achieve a level
of security. By rooting the device, the user voids any support and security these companies
are building into the system and are left on their own. For non-rooted devices, companies
maintain control over their App stores and marketplaces. Whenever a new application is
built it is submitted to the marketplaces for distribution. Upon arrival to the marketplaces
a team analyzes the app for potential problems before it is released. The degree of scrutiny
differs between the companies. Apple spends more time in the beginning checking Apps
for known problems before being released but offers little information about the app itself
upon installation. Google allows the community to decide if an app has flaws by giving
permissions the app needs upon installation and will remove Apps the community determines unsafe.
Marketplaces are designed to minimize the threats of malicious software from being
installed on a user’s device. This does make it harder for malicious software to spread
but many techniques are still used to infect devices using normal user level privileges
[14, 21, 22, 17, 9]. When apps like this are discovered, they are eventually removed from
the marketplace but by then the damage has been done. The current security policies of
these OSs, like iOS and Android, attempt to limit these actions but still need improvement
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and many attempts [15, 29, 4, 3, 23, 6] to improve security and attempts to educate users
are still being designed and implemented.

1.3

Malicious Software Design
Developers have different reasons for designing malware (financial gain, blackmail,

novelty, etc.), but any malicious software needs users to install it. It is for this reason
that malware authors design their malware to target operating systems used by the most
people.[14] A malware developer will develop malicious software for Windows over other
operating systems simply because of how much more widely used it is. As other OSs for
personal computers have grown more popular, so too has the interest in creating malware
for these operating systems.
Smartphones face the same trend in malicious software. When the technology was first
introduced, businesses were the primary consumer. Blackberrys were the dominent device
and the market was small and specific. With such a small target for developers, there was
little malware written for these devices[14]. As mentioned in section 1.1, smarthpones
became more widely used by casual consumers. It became possible for people to use the
devices for more personal reasons from entertainment to keeping financial records close
by. As more smartphones were being sold, the app markets for these devices received
more app submissions. With more apps on the market, the desire to use these devices for
personal use continued to grow causing the smartphones to be more widely used[14].
The increased usage of smartphones also increased the reliance on the devices allowing
for more targets of malicious software. No longer would the malware be used to target a
6

smaller niche group, but now it would be used to target a more diverse group of individuals giving more opportunity for their malware to be installed. What the world saw after
2007 was an increase in malware developed specifically for smartphones appearing on the
markets[14].
Malware authors had two problems to face with these new targets: They had to get
around the markets and they had to deal with user level access to the device. Unlike normal
desktops, the smartphones only give the user non-root access to the device. This makes it
harder to write code to access system level functionality and install the code. Third party
apps have a limited access to the phones forcing malware development to conform to the
same user level restrictions. The user cannot install an application that requests system
level permissions. Malware has to be able to perform its functions at a user level in order
to work on these devices.
The other problem facing malware developers is the app market. Android allows the
ability to install ”Unknown Sources” meaning that the app did not specifically come from
the Android market but from a third-party programmer. This can get around the market but
have to make the app easily available and is hard to advertise your app without being on
the market. To hit the largest number of people, a developer needs to place his or her app
on the market. With the app on the market, teams working for these companies have the
power to remove any app if found to be malicious either by their own security team or as
a response from the users. To get the app on the market, it is first tested for vulnerabilities
before being released. This means that the developers have to give their malware to the
companies and hope the malware passes inspection and is placed on the app stores.
7

The malware designed for these devices attempts to hide its activities. An app that is
taking personal information is easy to spot and will quickly be removed. An app that can
hide its activities by going through other apps on the device is much harder to track[21, 9].
While attempts have been made to scan for these types of attacks, if normal applications
did not have vulnerabilities, these types of attacks would not be feasible. This dissertation
looks at the approach of removing vulnerabilities from non-malicious apps in development.

1.4

Contribution and Hypothesis
When dealing with malicious software on smartphones, users can attempt to find the

malware and remove it. Attempts at detecting malicious activity have been made and
require the application to be installed and running on the device[15, 4, 2, 23]. When this
happens, the malware is installed and running until it can get detected. This method of
protection does not prevent the malicious software from running; rather, it attempts to find
and remove the malware in a reactionary way.
Educating users of the risk with installing applications will help reduce the amount
of malware installed on their devices. The difficulty of this approach is preventing the
malware from being installed. Attempts have been made to educate users on the effects
of malware on devices and give policies to the users that will minimize their risk from
malicious applications[22, 3, 8, 19]. A policy based approach helps give guidelines to the
user of the device to help protect it. This policy forms the rules the user must follow for
his or her device to maintain an accepted level of security. The ultimate security of the
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device is still in the hands of the user. While education helps the user with decisions, the
decisions are still made by the end user.
Android gives the user a policy for using the device and gives a set of tools designed
to scan for installed and running malware. This ultimately puts the security in the user’s
hands. As mentioned before [21, 9], most malware for these devices runs in user space
and relies on vulnerabilities in the permissions of currently installed apps to accomplish
their goals. This malware uses currently installed apps to retrieve any information it needs
from the system while hiding its intention. Instead of relying on the user making the best
decision, most permission-based vulnerabilities can be prevented during the development
of the application.
Software development models have been made with the purpose of giving a process to
developers for designing and building software. The goal of these models is to have the
developers plan every step in the building of the software with the end result being software
with fewer bugs and shorter maintenance phases. The better the software is built in the
beginning, the less time is spent fixing errors in the final product.[13] This is accomplished
by deciding complete functionality before the development begins.
Preventing permission misuse on mobile devices is a big step in preventing malware
from misusing the device. When a developer begins building an app, it is easy to leave
permissions open for later use or for functionality that the developer may want later on in
development.[11] By planning before building, a developer can establish all permissions
needed ahead of development. This will lead to permissions only being set that the developer needs to be set. This dissertation proposes a model of software development that is
9

tailored specifically to designing permissions of an Android application in an attempt to
minimize the permissions used. With fewer permissions being open, an app has a much
lower chance of being misused by other apps. Much like a software development model is
designed to map out functionality before programming, the author’s model is designed to
map out permissions and functionality before development and includes a checking process
in the last phase to ensure minimal permission setting.
The hypothesis of this dissertation is as follows:
The use of the Secure Android Development Model will allow developers to determine the minimal set of permissions needed for the application to function,
resulting in an app that has a minimal set of permissions.

The researcher defines minimal permissions as the set of permissions of an application
such that the removal of any one of the permissions will prevent the application from
meeting its functional requirements. An application should not have any more permissions
than is absolutely necessary to function. Every permission opened is another vulnerability
that can be exploited and this dissertation attempts to solve the problem by preventing
permission misuse at the developer level, not the user level.
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 will discuss all previous
work done with mobile device security and the Software Development Life Cycle. Chapter
3 discusses the Secure Android Development Model. Chapter 4 details the testing procedure for the model. Chapter 5 will discuss the analysis of the tests from chapter 4. Chapter
6 will detail the conclusions and future work of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
PREVIOUS WORK

There has been an increase in malicious software flooding the app markets for smartphones. This is a result of the growing usage and growing number of different types of
smartphones. With the increased threat of the devices, the need for securing them is a
growing concern. This chapter outlines the work previously done in this field.

2.1

Threats to Mobile Devices
With the increased usage in smartphone devices, there has been an increase in instances

of malicious software making its way to the devices. With more users of these devices,
there is more incentive for developers to get malicious software installed on these devices.
Adrienne Felt et al. compiled a survey of malware that was found out on the marketplaces
between the 2009 and 2011.
Figure 2.1, taken from [14], displays the timeline of malicious applications. From this
timeline, the researchers showed that these devices are susceptible to malicious attacks like
other digital devices. The amount of malware on Android started growing faster towards
the end of the timeline. This is around the time Android started gathering a larger market
share.[14] This section outlines the kinds of malicious applications and what their attack
goals are on these devices.
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Figure 2.1
Timeline of Malicious Applications Between 2009 and 2011

2.1.1

Malicious Application Types

Malicious applications can be installed and run on the device like any other application.
These can be downloaded from websites and side loaded (a process of installing an application from an unknown source) or they can be downloaded from the market place. While
most market places do build in checking to filter out applications that could be malicious,
there are some that sneak by [14, 33]. These applications can all have a different reason for
existing but they can be classified into three main categories according to [14]: Malware,
Personal Spyware, and Grayware.
Malware is an application that gains access to the device for the purpose of stealing
data, damaging data, or harassing the user. The malware can reside on the marketplace
with hidden usage or can be directly given to the user by the attacker. Once installed, the
malware allows the user to connect remotely to retrieve data. Trojans, worms, botnets, and
viruses all fall under malware by this classification and all can exist on mobile devices.
Personal spyware has some similarities to malware. The overall goal is to install software on the device that can monitor the usage of the device. The user of the software
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knowingly installs it on the device with the intent of monitoring how the device is used.
This is done to spy on someone close by whose device the user has physical access to,
or simply to monitor his or her own personal phone usage. Then end result is similar in
that the software can monitor data usage, phone calls, text messages, etc. and allows a
particular user to retrieve this information as his or her will.
Grayware is the term given to applications that collect user data for the purposes of
companies to gain targeted marketing information. These applications are not defrauding
the user because the companies will disclose the purpose of the application and the purpose
of the data collection. Companies can use it by giving ambiguous descriptions of the
purpose of the software. Usage of this software is legal.
While each application that can be developed as a threat has its own specific purpose on
a case-to-case base, the application can be classified in one of the three above threat types.
Malware is the one where the user of the device is tricked in some way into installing a
piece of software whose overall goal is to compromise the security of the user’s device.
With the other two types, the user is aware of the applications intent upon installation.
Even though a user intends for an application to have access to some of the personal data
of the device does not remove it as a threat. These applications are still a threat to the
security on the device because there is a user level application (as opposed to the OS level
applications built into the devices) that can access personal information of the device. With
permission settings used to place some security into the OS, another user level application
that is malware can still compromise one that is not and now the malware has access to the
information as well[9, 12, 33].
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2.1.2

Attack Goals of Malware on Mobile Devices

In their research of mobile malware in the wild [14], Adrienne Felt et al. collected 46
individual pieces of malware and classified it by its behavior. Table 2.1 is taken from [14]
and summarizes the behavior of the malware observed.
Table 2.1
Mobile Malware Behavior Count
Behavior

Count

Exfiltrates user inforamation
Premium calls of SMS
Sends SMS advertisement spam
Novelty and amusement
Exfiltrates user credentials
Search engine optimization
Ransom

28
24
8
6
4
1
1

One common goal of malware developers is to gain information (personal or other)
about the user of the system infected. This can be anything from passwords, to emails, to
documents with account information. The same is true for malware running on mobile devices. These devices are becoming more ubiquitous and contain more and more of users’
personal information [5]. Malware exists on these devices for stealing user information
and user credentials from the devices. Typical user credentials stolen are passwords and
bank account information. These devices allow for a user to check banking information
while away from their personal computers. This malware intercepts the keyboard presses
and reads the information presented back to the user. The user information stolen can be
14

information such as location, contacts, installed applications, text messages, and browser
history. This is all information that is used for marketing. The malware takes this information and the creator sells this information to advertising and marketing companies. A large
portion of malware in existence is designed to harvest user data for these purposes.
Malware can also be responsible for taking control of the mobile device and using
the device to make phone calls and send SMS to premium numbers (1-900 numbers).
This malware is capable of sending these messages and making silent phone calls to these
numbers without having the device even display the number pad [14, 33]. The malware is
allowing charges to be made by these numbers to the phone companies. The malware is
capable of doing this by having permission of the messaging and phone call systems. The
device will be in a user’s pocket and dial out to this number without any sort of indication
from the phone that the call is being made.
Along the same lines as dialing out to a premium number, some malware is capable of
using the SMS capabilities of one device to send out a group message to the contact list of
the user’s device with advertisement messages. This is no different from a company sending out a spam SMS from their computers but is illegal in most countries.[14] The malware
is designed to get around this problem by masking the company doing the spamming by
getting non-commercial devices to spam the messages for them. By having these devices
send the spam message themselves, it does not directly point back to the original source
and has to be traced back through all the compromised devices.[14]
Some malware exists for the sole purpose of existing. This type of malware is created
out of the novelty of having it out ”in the wild”. Rarely does the creator of the malware
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intend on using the application for any real malicious use. This malware exists because
the creators want to test or prove something. When a new update to an iPhone comes out
and a developer notices a bug in the update, the developer can create an app to exploit
this bug. The developer does not intend to hurt people’s devices but wants to test to see if
the malware will work. Some companies offer marketplaces to try and keep the malware
from being placed on the marketplace. This causes another test for developers to try and
take on. A developer can look at the marketplace and attempt to try and get an application
placed on the market with malware packaged in with it. These pieces of software are not
attempting to steal the user information from the devices. This software is designed for
the amusement of the developer but still has compromised access to the mobile device it is
installed on and this can lead to exploitation from other malware on these devices[14].
Malware can also be used for blackmail. This type of malware is intended to take
control of the mobile device and restrict usage and access from the user. The malware
developers will lock a device out of use and only unlock it after being paid. A Dutch worm
(no official name, the hacker who made it was Dutch) would lock the screens of iPhones
and demand that the users pay 5 euros to have their screens unlocked[14]. A desktop Trojan
Kenzero existed to steal the browser history of the infected computer[14]. This information
was then published publicly on the Internet with the user’s name associated with it. For
1500 yen, the information would be taken down. As mentioned before, malware exists on
these devices that can read a person’s Internet browsing history. The same idea exists on
malware of using this information in attempt to extort money from the user[14].
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Just like using malware to send SMS and phone calls to premium numbers, malware
can also use these devices to send SMS and web searches to certain websites. The idea
is the same as the premium number spamming. The malware uses the device to generate
traffic to these sites. This is not done to charge money to the phone companies like calling
a premium number but is done to increase traffic to websites. Search engines prioritize
results from searches based on the number of traffic hits certain sites receive. By having
different devices constantly search and go to a site, it inflates the traffic the site is receiving
helping make them a larger priority by the search engines[14, 33]. Researchers found this
to be a low priority malware but this type of malware has grown more common. Developers
making malware to generate network traffic has caused the growth in this type of attack.
Advertisement on these sites pay for hits and traffic flow of the sites. By having mobile
devices contact these sites, it generates more money from the advertisers[7, 33].
A problem with the malware on these devices is how hard it is to track down. Just
like advertisers using malware to have other devices spam SMS advertisements makes it
hard to track down the original source of the spam, malware can hide its activities. It can
be done by going through other apps [9] or it can be responsible for downloading the apps
actually performing the malicious behavior.[33] The malware DroidDreamLight would not
be responsible for the information stealing of the devices. Instead, it would connect to an
outside repository and download other applications. When the user realized there was
malware on the device, and tracked it down to these new apps, he or should could remove
them. When this happens, DroidDreamLight would re-download them and the process
started over again.
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2.1.3

Built In Security

The vendors of smartphone operating systems have included some built in security for
prevention of misuse of the devices. They offer a marketplace for any apps for the devices
and include some form of permission-based access for the software once installed.

2.1.3.1

Application Markets

The smartphone OS vendor encourage the users of their devices to have all of their
purchases and downloads of various apps through a centralized market. This market gives
the vendors more control over what applications they will allow users to install on the
users’ devices. With the control over the applications placed on the markets, the vendors
have an easier time in finding possible malware and keeping it off of the market. Users
who keep all of their apps updated through the market have the vendor’s protection against
malicious software[33].
Apple iOS has strict control over its market. The way they do this is by not allowing
users to install applications from alternate sources. Users of iOS devices must use the
market for any application they want. Short of a jailbreak on the device, the users have
no option in installing applications that do not exist on the market. This allows Apple to
have a strict review process. When a developer finishes an app, he or she posts it to the
market. The app must then go through a strict review process. The goal of the process is
to prevent as much malware as possible from being placed on the marketplace. The review
policy does not allow for personal spyware to be on the market, but can allow grayware to
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appear on the market. Apple will remove any grayware that it finds after the process and
any spyware and malware that managed to slip past the review as soon as possible[14].
Android provides a market for their apps as well, although the review process is much
more lenient when compared to Apple’s. Google allows for users to install apps from
alternate sources by enabling the Unknown Sources option. Because of this capability,
Google’s policy on reviewing apps prior to listing is minimal and they are only reviewed
after they have been uploaded to the market. Google relies more on user input for tracking
down malicious software. The Android security team does review applications based on
user feedback and will remove malware after review. The security team will also remove
any known malware remotely from a user’s device[14].

2.1.3.2

Application Permissions

In addition to having a centralized market for applications to exist, the vendors attempt
to keep interaction of the apps among each other limited. The operating systems use a
permission-based policy when determining what the applications are allowed to access.
Whereas Apple has stricter policies regarding the review process for their market, Android
has stricter policies for permission enforcement.
Apple iOS attempts to control the applications by having them run through their market. As a result the applications are installed and allowed to access whatever they were
programmed to access without consent from the user (the consent comes in the fact that
it passed the review process and is downloaded by the user). Any extra permissions that
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iOS needs approval for, such as location and notifications, require user acceptance during
runtime[1, 14].
Google’s policy for Android is that each application must request permission to access
any other part of the device or any other application running on the device. When an
application is installed on an Android device, the user is prompted with all the permissions
the app is requesting. The user has to approve these permissions, which are set when the
app is installed cannot be changed during run-time[14].
The permissions are designed to let the user know ahead of time what controls the
application needs. The user needs to approve the apps usage of these permissions before
the app is installed. This falls in line with Google’s philosophy of having the security be
more user oriented. Google expects the users to report problems to their security teams.
Apple’s approach corresponds to having the market control all apps installed on the device
with little user control. While having users agree to let apps have certain permissions
does give more control, too many permissions can make certain apps unsafe even if it was
unintentional[33].

2.2

How Malware Attacks Mobile Devices
Mobile devices are just as susceptible to vulnerabilities as any computer. Malware not

only exists but continues to grow with more mobile devices being used[14]. Knowing that
this malicious software exists is not enough to protect the devices, but knowing how these
devices are attacked and exploited will help in building prevention from these attacks. Built
in security such as markets and permission policies, are good to filter out most malware yet
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is not sufficient to protect from all. Permissions help cut down on malware, but overused
permissions can actually allow for more exploits to happen than intended[5, 9, 10]. This
section outlines how these attacks are possible.

2.2.1

Application Collusion

With the focus on permission based security on mobile devices the user has a need to
know what permissions are being used by the application at install time. With Android,
when the application is installed, a list of permissions is given and the user needs to accept
them. If the user does not accept the permissions then the application is not installed
preventing any harmful application from running. This policy is based on the user being
the one who determines which permissions are acceptable for an application to have. The
user acceptance of the policy also means the user must predict what harm can be done based
on the permissions. Google offers the ability for Android phones to be able to sync contacts
between the user’s phone and his or her Google account. To do this, the application has
permission to the contact list of the device as well as to network communication. This is not
necessarily bad but a user who sees that an application requires both could be attempting
to steal his or her information[5, 21].
Collusion attacks capitalize on the user having to make guesses as to the intent of the
application based on permissions alone. With Apple iOS not having the same permission
policy as Google, it is up to the market security team to be able to detect these attacks.
Google’s policy once again resides with the user checking the permissions on install. Either
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way, the attack works the same way with the end result being a different analyzer trying to
find the malicious apps.
The idea of a collusion attack is to have two or more applications that independently
have very few permissions and access to the device. However, when these applications
work together they act as one application with all of the permissions together[21].
Figure 2.2 shows a basic collusion attack with two independent apps. Application A is
a contact list manager application. This app only needs access to the Personal Information
permission. It is this permission that houses the contacts list for the device. Application
B is an app that requires some outside network access, such as a weather app. App B
needs permissions set for Network Access. The user of the device downloads both of these
applications independently of each other, sees that limited access each one is requesting,
and agrees to install them. The collusion happens when both apps work with each other
combining their permissions together. Once application A and B are installed, they are then
allowed to communicate with each other so that it is possible for A to send B the contacts
list, then have B send the contacts list out to a remote site.
With Android, each application resides in its own Virtual Machine (VM) called a sandbox. These sandboxes separate the application process from each other. This means each
process can be completely isolated but may still need to communicate. The Android Middleware is a middle layer which handles this communication by enforcing Mandatory Access Control[9]. In general an application needs to have appropriate permission to access
different parts of the OS. Each application is made up of components and these components can be public or private. Private means that only other components within the same
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Figure 2.2
Two App Collusion Attack
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application can access that component. Public meaning components of outside application
can access these components. While permissions need to be explicitly set, the components
access points (public or private) are not explicitly enforced. As such the OS defaults to
public so that applications will not be completely shut off from each other[11].
Application A, contact manager, has public components to send information to other
applications. Application B, weather, has public components to receive outside information from other apps. With this channel now open, the two applications work together to
retrieve a user’s contact list and send it out to some outside source. This attack is hard to
track because individually each application have very limited access to the phone and did
not seem like a threat.

2.2.2

Privilege Escalation

The privilege escalation attack is similar to a collusion attack. This still relies on a
user installing malicious software based on limited permissions, yet this kind of attack is
designed to work independently and exploit other applications with too many permissions.
The goal of a privilege escalation attack is to mask what the malicious app is doing by
using other applications to do its work. As mentioned above, permission to access device
and OS components needs to be explicitly made. This is because of the way the components are designed. A user made application can set how he or she wants components to
be accessed by making the components public or private. It is very easy to leave different
components of a developer’s application as public, especially if the developer is unsure at
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first what activities he or she wants the application to be capable of. A privilege escalation
attack exploits an open application that has access to some component of the system.

Figure 2.3
Privilege Escalation Attack

In this kind of attack, there are three applications installed on the device. Application
A is the malicious app, which will be doing the attack. Application B is a non-malicious
app that has components inside of it set as public, which are open to other applications.
Application C is a component of the OS that has restricted personal information, such as
the contact list. In the example application C has granted permission only to B while A
does not have it. This means that A cannot communicate directly with C. App B, on the
other hand, has open permissions to all of its components and so A can now communicate
with it. Because B has open permissions and has access to the information contained in C,
application A indirectly has the same information as well without needing the appropriate
permissions.
This kind of attack masks the software performing the attack by giving it limited permissions, yet still using the permissions of other applications to achieve its goal. In the
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above example app C is the contacts list of the device. App A is not given permission to
access the contacts list. This is limiting what the application actually can do, but it is able
to communicate with app B that has all the information of the contacts list. This bypasses
the need for A to actually have explicit permission to get the lists.
This attack and the collusion attack thrive on the misuse of permissions by applications
and on the fact that users may not fully understand or read the permissions when the applications are installed. The permissions are put in place by the OS to ensure some security
between the applications installed; yet, if not used properly can still allow for malware to
not just harm the device and information but hide what it is doing making it that much
harder to track down and prevent.

2.3

Current Security Attempts
As usage of smartphone devices grows, so do the attempts in exploitation of the devices.

The increase in malware in these systems has resulted in different attempts to protect the
devices from the new malware on the devices. These solutions are designed to protect
the end user of the device. There are different ways to protect the user. The user can
be educated as to understand the permissions of applications, and a device can have its
processes monitored from currently running malware. The work done in this area takes on
the role of protection after the discovery of vulnerabilities and does not focus on prevention.
This section outlines the security policies in development.
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2.3.1

Behavior Based Analysis and Security

Malicious applications run on the devices the same way as any other application. The
application needs to have permissions set to access components on the device, runs in its
own sandbox, and communicates through the Android Middleware like other applications.
It is once these applications are installed and running that the device becomes compromised. Once the application is running analysis of its process can reveal the data being
collected by the application. Through the collection of permissions of the application and
specific data being collected a security team can determine if the application seems to be
performing un-documented procedures. This is done with the collection of data during
install time and during runtime.[15, 29, 2]
Banuri et al. researched the idea of a runtime policy enforcer. This framework built is
designed to analyze an application during runtime and enforce the permission constraints
placed on the application. It starts by having the researches develop policies they call a
harmful sequence of permissions. An example of this is an application has the Internet
Access permission and later, through the interaction of other apps, gains the Record Audio
permission.[2] This sequence of permissions is labeled as a harmful sequence and a policy
is developed to handle it. The framework takes these policies and stores them in a Policy
Repository for reference. When an application is installed, the framework stores a copy of
the permissions from the Manifest.xml file in a permission repository. As the application
runs, the permission usage is kept track of and is recorded along side the permissions in
the permission repository.
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With both repositories filled, the framework begins analysis of the application during
runtime. As already specified, the application will make requests based on its permissions
and this total is incremented in the permission repository. The framework monitors permission usage to check against any of the harmful permission policies in place. Every time
a chain of permissions is established the framework must check this new chain against one
of its policies. The checking is done during runtime and when an application breaks any of
the framework’s policies the application can be isolated from the processes with an evaluation returned to the user. The ultimate goal is for the framework to enforce permission
constraints.
Other attempts at mobile security focus on standard malware detection techniques for
desktops.[29] These solutions attempt to handle the malicious behavior detection and classification that [2] could use to relieve the user made policy analysis. Shabtai et al. attempts
to solve the problem of classifying mobile malware with a framework they call Andromaly. The framework is designed to monitor application processes and attempt to classify
malicious behavior
Andromaly is a behavior-based detection framework. The framework uses machinelearning techniques [29] to monitor process communication and decide what is malicious
and what is not. The researchers monitor the processes at runtime looking at resource
consumption such as battery usage, packets sent / received, CPU consumption, and number
of running processes. By monitoring these resources the framework can determine which
applications are safe and which are not.
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During runtime, Andromaly monitors each application’s sandbox for the resource consumption. Over time it begins to build metrics for each application on the resource usage.
By using machine learning algorithms, the framework is able to determine the normal and
abnormal usage of certain resources. Andromaly will learn what is normal battery usage
and what is high battery usage. Each metric is sent to what they call a Processor, which
is the main analysis unit. This unit contains rule-based anomaly detection and makes a
classification of the particular application. Once the processor is done analyzing the app,
it is then sent to the Threat Weighting Unit, which gives the device an infection level. This
infection level is compared to the minimum and maximum thresholds for an infected system. The framework keeps the infection level stored and as more application data comes
in, the additional data along with the infection level are sent back to the processor to refine
the infection level.
Andromaly is useful in helping to classify the applications as malware by removing a
large part of human analysis. The whole process takes time and running on a single device
can be resource heavy. The framework monitors individual devices with no automatic way
of corroborating the information. A similar behavior-based malware detection framework
is called Crowdroid developed by Burguera et al[7].
Crowdroid monitors the application behavior at runtime as well. It monitors the Linux
Kernel system calls and sends all the calls out to a central server. Various devices run the
framework locally. When the framework detects the Linux Kernel calls, it sends the data
out to a centralized server. This allows many different devices to be running at the same
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time to give the central server a large dataset. The framework is crowdsourcing the work
to get large amounts of data in a short amount of time[7].
The researchers [7] use clustering techniques to partition the raw data into different
call vectors. The call vector is a string of numbers that represents a count of each specific
kernel call being made. The central server parses out the data and compares it to the system
calls and is able to classify the application based on the system calls. By taking samples
of applications from many different devices, the framework is able to determine which
ones are making suspicious calls and are expressing suspicious behavior. From there the
central server can classify each application as benign or malware. By analyzing malware
on the device by monitoring the behavior during runtime, a collection of malware can be
established to allow for removal from the market. The more runtime analysis used, the
more malicious calls can be classified to judge newer applications being developed.

2.3.2

Policy Based Security

Malware detection is useful when attempting to find problems with newer applications
as they appear on the market. By knowing how these applications attack the system, security teams are able to pinpoint the exploits in other applications. The heart of the security
teams for Apple’s iOS market, and Google’s Android market rely on these techniques in
finding existing malware to remove from the market. These pieces of malware keep showing up on the markets because of how easy it is for users to install them.
A problem with mobile device security is based on the users to protect their devices.
The end user of the device does not have the education or experience to know if an ap30

plication seems suspicious. With the market it is easy for a user to access the app he or
she wants and download it to the device. With Android’s policy of having the permissions
shown to the user before installation, and having the user agree to them, the assumption is
made that the user understands what these permissions are and how the applications will
use them. Most users can see no problem in these open permissions and will install that
application anyway[5].
While the inclusion of a strict permission policy builds in security for the device, a user
who grants an app access to these permissions has agreed to any exploit the application may
be using. One way to fix this problem is to educate users to the dangers of applications on
the devices. Researchers have developed policies with guidelines built for users to follow
to ensure more secure mobile devices.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a document in
2008 called Guidelines on Cell Phone and PDA Security[19]. The goal of the document is
to outline a set of guidelines that users of mobile devices can use to greatly increase their
security. NIST determined that people tend to violate these guidelines because they do not
think about them on a big scale. The give a list of User-Oriented Measures:
• Maintain Physical Control
• Enable User Authentication
• Backup Data
• Reduce Data Exposure
• Shun Questionable Actions
• Curb Wireless Interfaces
• Deactivate Compromised Devices
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• Minimize Functionality
• Add Prevention and Detection Software

As with any computer, the security of the device is gone as soon as an attacker has
physical access to the device. Maintaining physical control at all times is important for
any device. Loss of the device or theft not only makes the user lose the money invested
in the device, but now all of the personal data of the device is in someone else’s hands. In
the event of lending the device to another user, the owner should never leave the device
unattended because then the owner will not know what could have been placed on the
device[19].
Enabling user authentication allows for the device to be locked while not in use. When
a device is locked, it ensures that only the person who has the appropriate credentials, such
as a password, can unlock the device. In addition to being able to lock the device, user
authentication is crucial for installation of applications[19]. With Android, the user must
agree to the permissions before installation. But if the device has been Rooted at any point,
other applications can do installations without the user’s consent.
Backup all data on the device. Using the device as the only repository for any of the
user’s data is unsafe. The device can be lost, stolen, or damaged. If any of these events
take place then the user’s data will be lost and not recoverable[19].
Users can reduce data exposure by avoiding using the device as a storage place for
sensitive information such as personal contact information or financial records. While
authentication mechanisms can help protect the device from being accessed, as soon as the
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authentication breaks all the information is exposed to the malicious user. If any sensitive
information does exist on the device it should be encrypted[19].
Users should shun questionable actions by only allowing processes to occur that the
user is expecting. The user should not respond to unknown text messages nor click any
links sent to him or her. This could be a way of getting the user to download a malicious
app remotely. The user should also be aware of network connections and not allow any
network or Bluetooth connections to happen that the user was not expecting[19].
Users should curb wireless interfaces by disabling all network connections when not
in use. In the case of a smartphone, all wifi, Bluetooth, and mobile network access should
be turned off when not specifically using them. Staying offline reduces the chances of
malicious connections from reaching the device[19].
Users should deactivate all compromised devices as soon as they have been compromised. This is usually done if the device is lost. By deactivating the lost device, anyone
who finds it will be unable to use the device for personal gain. The device can also be
compromised while still in the user’s possession. It should still be deactivated immediately
until the malicious software can be removed. While compromised any communication the
device has can cause harm[19].
Users should minimize functionality by limiting the features of the device. The more
features and capabilities given to the device, the greater the risk in exploitation. Similarly
to deactivating all network connections, the device should not be using any capabilities
unless specifically being used at the time. More capabilities means more components to
attack[19].
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All devices should have prevention and detection software. Device encryption, antivirus software, firewalls, etc. all can be used to limit the chance of getting malware
installed on the device to keep it safe[19].
The document is intended to give a list of rules for users to follow for protecting their
mobile devices. NIST then goes on to encourage companies to use the rules to build
company-wide policies for employees to use. Alan Goode performed a study in which
he would ask companies questions about their mobile device policies. He discovered that
65% of companies allow employee-owned devices to be used for business purposes as well
as personal. In addition, 46% of respondents do not have a document outlining security
policy for mobile devices[16].
The idea of using one’s own mobile device to conduct business remotely is a growing
one. With the increase in usage of these devices for business use companies need to educate their employees to the dangers around exploitation of the devices. Goode proposes
that companies need to deploy policies their employees can follow to help reduce the vulnerability of their devices. He suggests forming policies around encryption, backup, and
authentication mechanisms[16].
The goal of policy driven security is to prevent the attacks from happening by giving the
user the tools and education he or she needs. Since most exploits come from user misuse
of the device, educating the users, can help prevent the malware from being installed on
the device before anything else can happen.
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2.3.3

Permission Based Security

The Android OS relies on a strict permission policy to secure their applications. The
whole concept revolves around the application needing to request explicit permission in
order to access components of the device.[1] If an application needs Internet connection, it
needs permission to the Network Connections privilege. Yet it is the permissions that can
be exploited to gain access to device components without privilege access[9, 30].
Bugiel et al. developed POSTER, a framework designed to monitor the communication
of applications against their permissions. This framework works on runtime like most of
the behavior-based security solutions. While POSTER is monitoring the communications
of the applications, it is doing so in context of the permissions of the application.
The framework monitors the Inter-Process Communication (IPC) and intercepts calls to
the reference monitor. The request is analyzed and compiled into a system security policy.
This policy contains the permissions needed for the communication to happen. The IPC is
continuously monitored and the information sent back is also recorded in a system security
policy. The system policies are checked against the manifest.xml file of the application
to check permissions. The permissions are checked to see if they will grant the access
the application is looking for. Upon determination that the application is going beyond its
permissions, the communication can be terminated and the application removed[24].
The goal of the framework is to prevent privilege escalation attacks by monitoring the
permissions of an application. Developers have a tendency to leave permissions open as
well as add permissions as they develop. As a developer programs his or her application for
Android, he or she has a tendency to make calls to APIs and instantiating new permissions
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each time. This creates a duplication of permissions in apps.[32] An application can have a
permission secured and not left open; however, if accidently duplicated, the duplicate will
not have the same restrictions placed on it. Table 2.2 displays the summary of applications
with duplicate permissions. The table was taken from [32].
Vidas et al. developed a plugin for the Eclipse IDE to help check the permissions
of developers during development. As the developer is coding the applications, the plugin
will monitor the usage of the permissions. Any time the plugin finds a duplicate permission
being called it notifies the developer to the duplicates and allows the developer to make the
appropriate change[32].
The problem with extraneous permissions is that it can leave holes open in the application. If the application has a duplicate Network Access permission, then the OS will
default to the one that has fewer restrictions on it. This permission may not be the one
used, but it is still opened. The opened permission can allow for a malicious user to exploit
the vulnerability with another application. This is how the device becomes vulnerable to
privilege escalation attacks.
The permissions set by the Android OS creates a level of security in the applications.
The permissions must be explicitly set to allow an application to communicate outside of its
own sandbox. The more permissions an application has set, the more open the application
is. Misuse of the permissions allows for the software to become vulnerable to outside
attacks. The goal of permission security is to reinforce the idea of application security by
using only the permissions the application needs.
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Table 2.2
Applications with Duplicate Permissions by Market Category
Market Category

Total Apps

With Duplicates

Arcade and Action
Books and Reference
Brain and Puzzle
Business
Cards and Casino
Casual
Comics
Communication
Education
Entertainment
Finance
Health and Fitness
Libraries and Demo
Lifestyle
Live Wallpaper
Media and Video
Medical
Music and Video
News and Magazine
Personalization
Photography
Productivity
Racing
Shopping
Social
Sports
Sports Games
Tools
Transportation
Travel and Local
Weather
Widgets

1344
1452
1352
1092
842
966
836
1311
1305
1522
1354
1258
1156
1489
537
1360
527
1124
1419
1342
1165
1319
216
1155
1296
1433
365
690
454
1473
342
1395

17
24
14
38
85
4
11
77
21
40
44
36
21
48
14
49
2
89
63
54
283
54
76
46
41
23
71
27
8
35
4
64
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2.4

Software Development Life Cycle
The concept of the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) was developed to stream-

line the designing and building of large software packages deployed by organizations. As
the use of computers for business grew, so did the complexity of the software running the
businesses. With less complex systems, it is possible for the developers to begin implementation, guiding the evolution of the system design. When the systems become more
complex it becomes harder to build without a solid design[13, 25, 31, 28, 18].
With the SDLC organizations break the software development into blocks or phases.
These phases are structured guidelines that are designed to make software development
easier and more cost efficient. Each phase is a piece of the overall system being built and
is taken one at a time. The ultimate goal is that if each phase is completed properly then
there should be little to no rebuilding of the system in the end.

2.4.1

Traditional SDLC

The software life cycle is used to model the phases that software should go through during development. Having a detailed list of goals in mind before the actually programming
begins makes it easier to know what functionality to build into the system. Each phase
is designed to build a particular part of the overall system and must be completed before
moving on to the next phase. Figure 2.4, taken from [25], shows the general life cycle.
Ragunath et. al [25] show a general model for a software life cycle as shown in figure
2.4. This model shows the general flow the developers will follow when building a new
software system. Each phase works on sequentially until completion. The first step is to
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Figure 2.4
General Life Cycle

work within the first phase of the life cycle and nothing else for the system is worked on
until this phase is completed. Once the first phase is complete, the developers move on to
the second phase. The above model is separated into four phases: Requirements, Design,
Implementation, and Testing.
The Requirements phase is where the developers of the system meet with the client requesting the system being built and decide what functionality the system requires. During
this time, the functionality is determined ahead of time and not as needed during implantation.
Next is Design. Once the functionality is determined, the developers move to a phase
where the software is designed before any code is written. It is this phase where the functionality is translated to components of the system and the messages the components will
use to communicate. This phase is used so that the high level design is used to guide the
implantation, not the other way.
Once design is complete, the developers move to Implementation. This phase is when
the software is actually programmed. All of the decisions made from the design are translated to code and the system is built.
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The last phase is Testing. Once the system is completely built, the software moves into
a testing phase where any errors and bugs are discovered and fixed. This phase polishes
the product before final delivery.
At each one of these phases, the developers are focused only on the phase they are
currently working. When in the Requirements phase, no time should be spent designing
the system. The ultimate goal of this process is to use each of the phases to guide the
completion of the next phases. If the developers are successful during the requirements
phase in gathering all requirements, these requirements can then be used to guide the design
of the overall system. With the requirements finalized, the developers have no reason to
constantly get a requirement and alter the design as newer requirements arrive. At each
new phase, all previous phases are completed and should have no need to be revisited.
When the developers are finished designing the system, then all of the requirements will
be accounted for in the design and implementation would have no need build off of the
requirements. This process continues until the system is completed.
The general model has been used as the basis of developing other software life cycle
models. The process is simple as it clearly defines a phase and the progression through
the phases. The general model is usually represented a second way known as the Waterfall
Model[25].
The concept of the Waterfall model, shown in Figure 2.5 taken from [25], is to show
the different phases of the life cycle and at each step the model ”steps down” falling like
a waterfall. The idea behind the Waterfall is the same idea that the general model was
displaying. During the software development process the developers go through different
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Figure 2.5
Waterfall Lifecycle Model

phases. Once each phase is completed, the developers step into the next phase of development. While the phases can changed based on a particular client’s needs, the idea of how
to use the phases in the Waterfall remains the same.
Although considered a flawed model [25], the Waterfall model is just an extension of
the general approach to SDLC and is simple to understand. The simplicity of the model is
why it is used to teach the concept of SDLCs. Once the developers understand this concept
changes can be made to the model to fit their particular needs. Even though flawed, this
general approach is useful in guiding the way developers go about building a system and
extensions have been made to help improve on this model[28].
The flaw with the Waterfall and the general model of software development is that it
does not allow for any backtracking through the phases if requirements or design decisions
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change. Some adaptations have been made to account for this with the Iterative Feedback
Waterfall model. This model does allow for the developers in a phase to step back to the
previous phase. This still only allows for one step at a time and must be completed before
stepping back again, or moving forward. The rigid flow of these general models makes
changes and adaptations harder to implement and has led to the design of more flexible
models.

2.4.2

Flexible SDLC

It is common for decisions to change during the development cycle. If during development the customer decides to add some additional requirements, then the development
team must be able to adapt the design without starting over. The traditional approach to
SDLC had the developers complete a phase and move onto the next phase with no easy
way to go back. That approach works if the system does not need to be changed in the
middle of any particular phase. Flexible models of SDLC do not require an entire phase
to be 100% completed before moving onto the next step. They allow for the developers to
reevaluate the process in each phase and determine ahead of time if changes will need to
be made.
The look-ahead component of these models is what allows them to be flexible to
changes in the system during development. The Spiral Model developed in 1986 by
Boehm[28] gives developers a guideline to developing the system with reevaluation at
each phase.
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Figure 2.6
Spiral Model
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The Spiral model was designed to allow for greater risk assessment during development. Like the traditional model the Spiral model still breaks development into phases,
but it is not concerned with completion of a phase before moving on with no real plan for
going backwards. The Spiral model allows for the developers to retrieve feedback while in
a phase to allow for adjustments to be made during the lifecycle.
In figure 2.6 taken from [28], the starting point is requirements planning like the traditional model. The requirements are gathered then are submitted to a risk analysis subphase. The risk analysis is designed to look at the requirements and begin prototyping a
design to match them. This prototype begins the design phase while still gathering all of
the requirements. The prototype is then used to elicit feedback from the customer to insure
that the integrity of the requirements is being maintained in the design. If any changes need
to be made, the process loops back around again gradually moving into the other phases of
the lifecycle.
With the Spiral model, the ability to combine multiple phases (meaning what the general model would call phases) together gives the developers a way to look ahead and determine if changes need to be made before they happen. At each stage the developers
prototype the current incarnation of the system that is used to gain feedback from the customer. This prototyping gives greater flexibility in the overall designing and building of
a system. This concept can be used to modify existing models by adding in a circular
transition between phases during development.
The Rapid Application Development (RAD) model is a methodology designed by
James Martin in 1991. [28] As seen in figure 2.7, the RAD model takes the general model
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Figure 2.7
Rapid Application Development

from traditional development and adds a cyclical transition between phases that allows for
incremental development. In RAD the requirements are defined, a design is made, the design is developed and created, and the system is tested. The results of the test are used to
judge the system and, going back to requirements definition, makes adjustments. The key
for this model is that each phase is not iterated through only once. Small prototypes are
made and used to redesign parts of the system. With each pass through the cycle, more
components of the system are added. By prototyping each component, the developers are
able to know that these components work when it comes to adding more to it.
The goal of having SDLC models is to reduce the overall cost by having all parts of the
system designed before implementation of the system. By not having to backtrack through
development, the developers are able to save time making the system. The key to having
a flexible model is the ability to cycle back to other phases without losing work. These
flexible models make great use of prototyping to gain feedback. The prototypes are built
and given back to the customer for review. Once the prototype is approved it can then be
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used to build upon. The constant building on earlier prototypes is how models like the
Spiral Model are able to keep development time low while still allowing the flexibility of
change during development.

2.4.3

Summary of Reviewed Works

Many attempts at Android (and all smartphone OSs in general) security relies on a tool
or process to protect the device after applications have been installed. Malicious software is
written to exploit vulnerabilities in poorly design applications. Current research in Android
security deal with tools designed to protect from known vulnerabilities by isolating or
completely removing vulnerable applications from the device.
Software development life cycles exist to assist in the design and building of software
applications. These models and methodologies result in less time spent redesigning code
during and after testing. With current methods of security focusing on protecting devices
after installation, research in preventing poor design from the beginning is sparse. The
proposed model utilizes SDLC methodologies to prevent poor design and open permissions
from final Android applications as detailed in chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
SECURE ANDROID DEVELOPMENT MODEL

The Secure Android Development Model is designed to give the steps and tools necessary for developers to implicitly build security into their applications. This chapter outlines
the procedures leading to the development of the model as well as the model itself. The
chapter is organized as follows into three sections. 3.1 Inconsistent Permission Usage details how permissions work and why they can offer security holes. 3.2 Permissions Defining explains how developers can get a list of permissions and organize them into priorities.
3.3 Secure Android Development Model shows the model itself with a detailed explanation
of each step.

3.1

Inconsistent Permission Usage
When a developer makes an application, part of the design involves knowing what ac-

tions the application will be making that require permission to access. The application
needs to be explicitly permitted to access the components within the system. The same
security principle applies to a user-made app trying to access other user-made apps. Each
application is made up of smaller components. The components are smaller pieces of software that interact with each other for functionality (object-oriented style of development).
For an application to access components from another application there needs to exist per47

missions for this interaction. The developer of the application needs to decide whether
the components need to be public or private. A public component is open to other applications while a private component is only available to other components within the same
application.
Public components are reachable by outside applications and will require permission to
access. The developer designs a user-made permission that other applications must know
about and request in order to communicate with it. In the event that a developer assigns
a component as public without specifying a permission, the OS allows any application to
access the component. A developer can often overlook this feature in the quick development of the application[11]. If a component is not made public or private, the OS can
decide during compilation what the component should be. This can lead to components
that should be private being public without any access permissions assigned to them.
A developer can also request too many permissions from the OS during development
if unsure what the end result of the application will be. By opening up many different
permissions, the application is exposing itself to more access points. For example, an
application can be given access to the Bluetooth capability of the device. As soon as a
malicious developer discovers an exploit in the Bluetooth application native to the device,
any application that connects to it is exposed. This is unavoidable if the application relies
on the Bluetooth of the device. It becomes a problem if an application is developed with
this permission given and not being used. Developers can leave permissions open even if
there is no appropriate API calls being made[32].
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Development can be a quick process where decisions are made spontaneously. When
the decisions are made spontaneously there is no revision made to ensure that every component left open is being used by teh system. Any open connection leaves the application
vulnerable to other applications. The best practice is to have the minimum permissions
needed to run the application being called.

3.2

Permissions Defining
The first process to software development is to define the requirements. The require-

ments of the system are the actions that the software must perform and capabilities the
software must have. Accessing an online database as well has having a simple GUI are
both examples of requirements. With Android applications, the actions performed by the
software still need to access permissions from the system. The first step in developing an
android application is defining what actions the software will take and what permissions
need to be requested for these actions.
During the development process, it is easy to add more permissions to the Manifest.xml
file while making API calls in the source code. As mentioned earlier developing in this
style can lead to permissions being opened and left opened after the associated API call is
no longer used. It also leads to duplicate permissions being opened without firmly controlling both. The developer only maintains control of one of the duplicates at a time[32].
The Android API defines two classifications of permissions for the manifest: Manifest.permission and Manifest.permission group. The idea of having a permission-group is
to wrap similar permissions together into one. An example of this is the permission-group
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BLUETOOTH NETWORK. This permission is in reality a collection of other permissions. In this example BLUETOOTH NETWORK contains the following permissions:
BLUETOOTH, BLUETOOTH ADMIN, and BLUETOOTH PRIVILEGED. The use of
the group is to ease application building for the developer. The developer has to only make
one permission call rather than three in his or her manifest file. The disadvantage to using
groups is that all permissions in the associated group are open, even if they are not being
used. The first way to prevent overuse of permissions is to not utilize permission-groups.
In addition to adding system permissions as needed, the developer can choose to not
specify any permissions associated with the application’s components. Any component left
open as public must have user made permissions associated with it or else any application
can access the component. The developer needs to plan ahead of time what actions the
application will take when working with other applications and set its own permissions
before development starts.
To determine what permissions the application needs the developer must decide the
requirements of the system. From the requirements the developer prioritizes them based
on preference[20]. When determining preference the developer asks himself or herself,
”What requirements are necessary for the application to function, and what requirements
are nice to have but not crucial?” The requirements can then be broken down into the
permissions needed for it to run.
The requirement in figure 3.1 is the application needs to use Bluetooth capabilities.
From here we find three permissions associated with Bluetooth. BLUETOOTH is used to
allow applications to connect to and communicate with paired devices. BLUETOOTH AD50

Figure 3.1
Breakdown of Bluetooth Access Requirement

MIN allows applications to discover and pair with Bluetooth devices. BLUETOOTH PRIVILEGED is used to allow applications to pair with devices without the user interacting with
them. All of these permissions are used for a Bluetooth connection, but not all of them are
needed. The application can function with just the BLUETOOTH privilege and the user
can manually discover and pair devices outside of the application. Because the user can use
the built-in functionality to pair with other Bluetooth devices, the only one that is needed
for the app to work is the BLUETOOTH permission. The others are nice to have but not
crucial.
As mentioned earlier, there exists a permission-group that encapsulates all three of
these Bluetooth permissions. A developer can call the group permission and not have to call
three separate individual ones. Using the permission-group can be useful if the developer
needs to use all three of the Bluetooth permissions. Unless it all three of these permissions
are needed, using the permission-group for Bluetooth will result in open permissions not
being utilized by the application.
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Figure 3.2
Breakdown of More General Requirement

A requirement can also be a more generalized task without specific permissions tied
to it. Figure 3.2 shows the requirement of the device needing network access to remote
sources. This is broken down into three other tasks specifically as needing Internet access,
wifi information, or Bluetooth connectivity. Each requirement is further broken down into
sub components and on until a list of permissions is established. The goal of this process
is to establish the permissions a developer will need for the application.

3.3

Secure Android Development Model
With the problems permissions can present to a developer, having a process to follow

to ensure minimum permission usage (both system permission request, and user made
permission) will result in cleaner coding with fewer outside openings. The more activities
a single application performs, the more vectors of attack are open to it from privilege
escalation and collusion attacks. The Secure Android Development Model (SADM) is a
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development lifecycle model that focuses on creating an application that achieves all the
intended functionality with minimal permissions.
The SADM consists of 4 main development phases and a delivery phase. The phases
all contain steps for developing the permissions needed for the application to work. Each
phase with the exception of the Build Application phase all contain sub-phases to further
isolate the activity into smaller but still important steps. The model follows a standard
Spiral Model of software development. This model focuses mostly on generating the Manifest.xml file for the permission setting. Figure 3.3 illustrates the steps of SADM.

3.3.1

Permission Gathering

The Permission Gathering phase is the first phase in the process. This phase is similar
to a requirements gathering phase as the goal is to determine before implementation what
kinds of permissions are going to be needed. The phase is broken into three sub-phases:
System Requirements, Component Requirements, and Permission Listing.
In the System Requirements sub-phase the developer is attempting to determine all of
the permissions the application will need to request from the operating system. The developer plans for every interaction with the system the application will be wanting and
listing these as requirements for the system. Once the requirements are determined the
developer follows the process of decomposing the individual requirements into the permissions needed. The decomposition will break each requirement into sub-requirements,
which helps in further refining the requirements, and will yield the permissions. Figure 3.4
illustrates the process of going from a requirement to a set of permissions.
53

Figure 3.3
Secure Android Development Model
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Figure 3.4
Decomposition of Requirements to Permissions
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The Component Requirements sub-phase follows the same idea as the previous subphase except that it is for any actions the applications will make regarding receiving and
sending information to other applications. The components of each application are what
run it. For each application, if there are components that need to send data to other applications, then the component needs to be made public and a user made permission needs to
be implemented. If the application needs to receive data from other application it needs to
know what the user defined permission is for the app and request it. The end result will
be a list of components needing to be public with any of the user defined permissions the
application will require for others as well as any extra permissions the application needs
from other applications.
The last sub-phase is the determining of permissions. Once all of the requirements have
been determined and the decomposition leading to the list of permissions has been made,
the developer then organizes the list of permissions. This final step is to ensure that any
permission that meets the needs of the requirements is included to be prioritized.

3.3.2

Manifest Design

After the requirements for permissions are established, the developer then moves to the
Manifest Design phase. Before any implementation is started, the Manifest.xml needs to
be constructed to enforce the permissions determined before development. This enforces
the idea of not adding any new permissions during development and sticks to maintaining
what was determined during the initial design. This phase is broken into two sub-phases:
Prioritize Permissions and Create Manifest.
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By the Prioritize Permissions sub-phase the developer has taken his or her initial requirements and extracted a list of permissions. The list of permissions is still unrefined and
needs to be prioritized. The prioritization is to establish what permissions are necessary
to function and which permissions are simply to add more functionality to the application.
The developer progresses through each of the requirements, looks at every permission, and
determines the ones vital for the application to function and which ones make using the
application easier. The goal is to get a minimal list of permissions set.
Table 3.1
Statements About a Permission to Determine Its Priority
Statement Template

Meaning of Statement

need X
X would be nice
Y needs X
never X
Y and X

Permission X must be used to satisfy requirement.
Permission X makes functionality easier.
Permission Y needs Permission X to function.
Permission X never needs to be used.
Functionality requires both permissions Y and X.

The Create Manifest sub-phase is started once the permissions are prioritized. The
developer takes the determined permissions and creates the Manifest.xml file for the application before development. The file is created and all of the permissions are put into it
ahead of time. With the permissions being preset into the Manifest.xml file, the developer
can use it to maintain integrity on the API calls for the permissions during development.
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3.3.3

Application Development

Once the Manifest.xml file is created and all of the permissions determined, the user
then can start programming the actual application. This phase is only concerned with the
coding. The pre-generated Manifest.xml will be used to guide the development of the
application by giving the developer the idea of what API calls will need to be made for
the various permissions. No API call should be made that does not have a corresponding
permission set in the file. Likewise, there should not exist a permission left open that does
not also have a corresponding API call.

3.3.4

Test Permissions

After the application is built, it should be tested for conforming to the integrity of the
model. Testing is needed before any application is released to the market. For this model,
testing refers to the testing of the permissions against the original Manifest.xml. This phase
will perform the checking with the goal of checking to see if any new permissions were
added or changed during development. The phase is divided into two sub-phases: Check
API Usage and Check New Manifest Against Old.
The Check API Usage sub-phase is designed to find inconsistencies between the API
calls of the software with the Manifest.xml file. During development, decisions can be
changed with respect to functionality and API calls made by the application. These changes
result in permissions being set in the Manifest.xml but never used. This violates the minimum permission constraint the model enforces. This sub-phase is a manual process forcing
the developer to check for an appropriate permission set for every API call.
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The next sub-phase, Check New Manifest Against Old, is designed to check for integrity between the premade Manifest.xml and the resulting one. Similarly to changing
decisions with API calls, permissions can be added or removed as design changes happen
during development. This sub-phase checks the permissions listed in the new Manifest.xml
file with the permissions set in the premade one.
The next step is to determine what process to take if there is inconsistency between
the predetermined permissions and the ones set at the end. In the event that either of the
two sub-phases result in inconsistent permissions, the priorities and requirements need to
be reevaluated. The process loops back to the beginning Permission Gathering phase and
repeats itself. This loop continues until a final permission set is equivalent to the one made
before development.

3.3.5

Application Delivery

After the process has been completed (even if it took more than one iteration), the
final step is to deliver the application. The result from following the previous phases is
an application that contains a minimal number of permissions both set and requested in
order for the application to function properly. While more permissions could make use
of the application easier at times, by keeping the interaction of the app to a minimum
the developer has reduced the risk of having his or her application compromised by other
malicious software.
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CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

In Chapter 3 a methodology was outlined for secure software development on the Android system. This chapter describes the experimental design and reports on the results of
experimentation by the participants. The participants were given a set of requirements for
an Android application to build. The participants used the SADM methodology to build
the application and completed a survey upon completion. The results of the survey and
the final permission list are used in conjunction to analyze the effectiveness of using the
methodology for development. This chapter describes this experiment and presents the
results.

4.1

Testing Plan
The hypothesis proposed in this dissertation is that using the proposed SADM method-

ology results in minimal usage of permissions for an application. As stated earlier, this
dissertation defines minimal as the fewest number of permissions used to satisfy the requirements. To test this, the methodology needs to be used by software developers and
have an application built. This section presents the application built by participants as part
of the experiment testing the methodology.
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4.1.1

Model Verification and Test Case Design

Verification of the model was performed by the researcher building an application based
on existing apps. The application was built to allow for two devices to connect to each other
allowing for message transmission and file sharing. One user needed to pick a file from his
or her device and send it to a connect device. In addition to file sharing, the two devices will
be able to send short text based messages to one another. Prior to building the application,
the researcher began a survey of applications with similar capabilities from the app market.
A total of 20 different applications were analyzed. These applications were a combination
of file transferring and messaging applications and the distribution is showing in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1
Pre-Test Analysis Application Type
Application type

Number of Applications

File Transfer only
Messaging only
Messaging and File Transfer

5
5
10

The permissions of each application were checked against the usability of the application itself. If a permission was set by the application then the user should be able
to utilize it. For example, a file transfer application the application needs to set the android.permission.READ EXTERNAL STORAGE and the android.permission.WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE permissions. These permissions can be seen by the user in the
form of finding a file to transfer and downloading a file from another user respectively.
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Any permission set by the application that did not have some usable functionality by the
user was recorded. Table 4.2 shows a list of unused permissions and how many applications
had these permissions set.
Table 4.2
Permission Usage
Permission

File Transfer Only

ACCOUNTS
MICROPHONE
PERSONAL INFO
SOCIAL INFO
DISPLAY
NETWORK
SCREENLOCK
STORAGE

Messaging Only

Unused Permissions
4
3
5
3
Used Permissions
4
5
5
5

Combination

5
2
5
5

9
10
10
7

5
5
4
5

10
10
10
10

Using this information, a test application was developed that utilized the common functions of these applications. The permissions used for the application were the same permissions presented in table 4.2. The application built by the researcher resulted in many
different permissions opened with no functionality utilizing them. The permissions set
were deconstructed from the group permissions to individual ones. Through three different rounds of requirements mapping, the specific requirements were determined and a final
list of permissions was generated.

62

Table 4.3 lists the starting permissions used for initial test application. From this, a set
of requirements was built and a list of permissions was determined for the requirements.
Table 4.3 shows the requirements and the related permissions for them.
This application verified the steps in the SADM process. The researcher built an application that achieved all of the functional requirements with the fewest permissions possible.
It was determined that if any of the permissions were removed, then the application would
not meet all of the requirements.
Validation of the model began after the initial tests with a group of volunteers. The
application built by the researcher is used as a control to compare with the volunteers’ final
product. The case study relied on each participant building the same application built by
the researcher during verification.

4.1.2

Test Environment

Validation of the model was performed by a group of participants recreating the application built during verification. Participants with backgrounds in software development
were chosen and given the application requirements for developing. The validation group
consisted of a mixture of students and industry developers. Each participant was given
the requirements for the verified application. The participants used the SADM to build
the same application as the researcher and had their final permission list compared to that
predetermined before testing began.
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Table 4.3
Requirements and Associated Permissions
Functional
Requirement

Permission Associated with Requirement

Notes

Encrypt File/Message

None

No permission used to
encrypt files and messages before sending to
device.

Decrypt File/Message

None

No permission used to
decrypt files and messages before sending to
device.

Connect to other
device

None

Two devices need to be
able to communicate with
each other.

Connect to the
internet

INTERNET

Allows for sockets to be
opened between devices
over the internet.

ACCESS WIFI STATE

Needs to access the wifi
hardware on the device
for internet usage.
Connects to wifi hardware of device.

Only transfer over wifi
CHANGE WIFI STATE
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Table 4.3
(continued)
Functional
Requirement

Send Messages to
devices

Send Files to devices

4.1.2.1

Permission Associated with Requirement

Notes

None

No special permission is
needed to send text over
network sockets.

READ EXTERNAL STORAGE

Read files from a device
in order to send over network.
WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE Files received over network needs to be written
to device.

Test Group

The SADM is a software development model. Since it is a software development model
the targets for participation are those familiar with software development on some level.
A mix of students and industry workers were used for this test. Four of the participants
were Computer Science and Software Engineering students at Mississippi State University
while seven were software developers working in industry in various areas in and around
Mississippi.
As shown in Table 4.4, all of the participants have experience with programming applications. Only one reported his experience as being medium with a majority of participants
rating themselves as high. When asked about their experience with Android application
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Subject Gender Programming Experience* Android Development Experience* Use Smartphone Everyday
1
M
High
None
Yes
2
M
High
Low
Yes
3
M
Medium
None
Yes
4
M
High
Low
No
5
M
High
Low
Yes
6
F
High
Medium
Yes
7
M
High
None
Yes
8
F
High
Low
Yes
9
M
Expert
High
Yes
10
M
Expert
Medium
Yes
11
M
High
Low
Yes
* None(0 years), Low(1-2 years), Medium(2-3 years), High(3-4 years), Expert(4+ years)

Participant Demographic

Table 4.4

development, the participants have not had as much experience with that platform. Most
participants had low to no experience developing applications on Android, yet one reported
having high experience. While the participants are experienced programmers, there was
more variety in each subject’s personal experience with development on the Android platform.
With the exception for one individual, all of the participants reported using a smartphone in their everyday life. As explained in Chapter 2 this is a result of the ubiquity of
these devices in people’s lives. Development of an application for a smartphone is different
than development on a standard computer system. The type of smartphone each participant
used was deemed irrelevant as the main concern is understanding on a general level of how
someone interacts with the device.

4.1.2.2

User Case Study

Using the SADM requires that a developer build an application for the Android environment. By using this methodology, a developer is able to build any application he or
she wants by providing the ability to determine which permissions should be used before
development. This allows for any application to be built using this methodology. To control the test groups, an application was built by the author before testing. This application
was used to determine a set of requirements given to each participant. The resulting application’s Manifest.xml was used to determine the appropriate permissions the participants
should use. This same application was given to each participant to keep a control over
permissions expected compared to permissions delivered.
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Each participant was provided with a detailed explanation of the SADM. The researcher provided the visual model and an explanation of the methodology. The requirements provided the vision of the end application and the SADM provided the structure on
how to build it. The participants followed the researcher’s model to develop the application. Once the model and requirements were given to the participants and development
began, the researcher had no more interaction with the participants until the task was completed. Each participant was then given a survey and briefly interviewed by the researcher.
The survey and the participant’s resulting permission list was returned to the researcher for
analysis. The survey answers provided the researcher with how the participants used the
methodology to generate their final permission list. The final permission list was compared
to the expected list generated by researcher. Section 4.2 explains how the participants used
this model and how their final list compared to the one the researcher expected.

4.2

Experiment Results
After the participants completed their tasks, a survey was filled out and returned to the

researcher along with the final list of permissions generated for the application. By using
the SADM methodology, each participant would generate a list of permissions. This list is
then compared to the list generated by the researcher. The goal is to have the participants
achieve the same permission list as expected by the researcher. Having the end permission
list by itself is not enough. This list has to have been generator by using the methodology.
The surveys allow for each participant to respond to how he or she used the methodology
to build the application.
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By looking at the final permission list and the information provided by the post-test
surveys, the researcher determined how the participants used the model to build the application. The surveys also provide information for how useful the methodology is for application building in general. The SADM is a development model and can only be effective
if it is useful. In addition to testing the model usage for generating the final permissions, it
is also of interest to the researcher to inquire into the overall usefulness of following this
methodology for development.
The rest of this section details the results for the usage of the model for permission
building and the usefulness of the model as a development model.

4.2.1

Permission Generation Results

Will following the SADM methodology result in a minimal number of permissions set
for an Android application? This is the question attempting to be answered by this study.
As previously said ”minimal” refers to the number of permissions needed so that every
functional requirement is addressed. In this study each participant was given requirements
(as specified in section 4.1.1) for an application to be built. The application is an Android
based application that allows users on two different devices to send messages to each other
and share files with one another. Each participant built the application following the development strategies of the proposed methodology. The participants were then given a
post-test survey to fill out. This survey allowed the participants to report on their usage of
the model and how effective it was at guiding the permission gathering for the application.
The survey was returned with a list of the resulting permissions designed to the researcher.
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The iterative refactoring process of the model is the main part of determining the resulting permissions. The combination of resulting permissions was taken into account with
how many times each participant needed to iterate through and redesign his or her permissions. Question 9 (Q9) of the survey asks the participants if any time was spent reevaluating
the application’s final permission list with the one that they built before development. Each
participant reported that he or she had to refactor at least one time to get their final permission list. Each participant’s permission list was compared to the researcher’s expected list
and every participant reported had a match. This researcher defines a match as a participant’s final permission list exactly matching the expected permission list generated by the
researcher prior to running the experiment. Table 4.5 summarizes these results.
Table 4.5
Permission Results Summary

Subject
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Final permissions compared
to expected permissions

Number of times reevaluating
permissions

Match
Match
Match
Match
Match
Match
Match
Match
Match
Match
Match

1
3
1
1
2
1
2
1
3
1
1
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Most of the participants only had to reevaluate one time. Each participant reported
that before development, a list of permissions was determined to satisfy the requirements.
Upon reaching the reevaluation phase, each participant was able to remove permissions not
in use and design a new set of permissions for the application. Each participant reported
their beginning permission list along with their final permission list. Table 4.6 shows the
comparison of beginning and ending permissions.
Table 4.6
Initial versus Final Permission List

Subject
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Number of Initial
Permissions

Number of Final
Permissions

Number of times
reevaluating
permissions

10
10
10
10
9
11
10
9
8
10
10

5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5

1
3
1
1
2
1
2
1
3
1
1

Every participant reported having a higher number of permissions determined prior to
application development. After spending as few times as one reevaluation process, the
number of permissions was dropped to five total.
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Question 11 on the survey asks the participants to determine if every permission implemented in the application corresponded to functionality given by the requirements. Every
participant reported that each permission is corresponded to at least one functionality of
the application. This can be seen by the fact that each participant started with more permissions than necessary and through refactoring got them trimmed to a fewer number.
Questions 5 and 12 on the survey both address the issue of using the SADM methodology to get these permissions. As reported above, each participant was able to trim down
the total permissions being used while going through the development process. These two
questions allow for the participants to report on how effective the model was at providing
them the way to get the final permission list. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 summarize the results of
these questions.
Table 4.7
Effectiveness for planning permissions
Q5:How effective was SADM at making the development process plan
out the permissions used by the application?
Option
Not effective
Slightly effective
Somewhat effective
Very effective
Extremely effective

Fequency/Percentage
0/0%
0/0%
2/18%
6/55%
3/27%

The participants all reported that using the SADM was very helpful and very effective at
planning out and determining the permissions of the application. The participants reported
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Table 4.8
Planning permissions before implementation
Q12:How much did it help to plan out the permissions before
programming began on the application?
Option
Not helpful
Slightly helpful
Somewhat helpful
Very helpful
Extremely helpful

Fequency/Percentage
0/0%
0/0%
1/9%
9/82%
1/9%

that by using the model, they were able to determine what permissions were necessary
and reduce the number of permissions open. The resulting applications built during testing
ended up with fewer permissions open than if the application was built through with one
iteration.

4.2.2

Permission Generation Analysis

Each participant was given the same requirements and details for the same application
to build. Using the SADM for development, each participant was successful at building the
application. Each participant returned a list of pre-development permissions and a list of
final permissions. It has been shown that each participant developed a list of permissions
that was unsatisfactory during the building of the application. The participants all ended
with a matching set of permissions to what the researcher expected. No participant was able
to generate the correct permissions from the start and had to iterate through the permission
evaluation process at least once.
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The model provided the process by which the participants were able to reevaluate the
permission list. The iterative process when this reevaluation occurs gave each participant the opportunity to trim down his or her initial permission list. Most participants had
to reevaluate only once. None of the participants reported determining the minimal permission list prior to implementation of the application. Each participant took the general
requirements and decomposed them into more specific ones. A list of permissions that
could possibly satisfy the requirements was generated. Each participant had to reevaluate
the ending permission list compared to the functional requirements.
The SADM was reported as being overall effective with providing the participants with
the ability to plan out the permissions. By combining the reported level of effectiveness, the
participants felt the SADM was at gathering permissions with the fact that each participant
reevaluated their set of permissions at least one time, we can see that the participants did
not just guess at the permissions. The participants were able to determine the appropriate
permissions by iteratively evaluating the permissions against the functional requirements.

4.2.3

SADM Usage Results

The SADM is a software development model and as such needs to be practical for such
usage. No matter how effective it is for refining a list of permissions, the model will not
be used if it interferes with the development process. The survey given to the participants
allowed each one to rate how effective using the model was in the overall development
process. The goal of these questions is to gather insight into how developers use the model
for their development. Tables 4.9-4.14 summarize this information.
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The participants all were given the requirements of the application. All participants
have experience in software development. While actual development on Android was not
as experienced by the participants, they all understood how to take requirements and build a
final product at the end. Before explanation of the SADM, each participant was given some
time with the requirements to figure out a plan of development. Three of the participants
responded to the researcher that they had no real plan for the application and would just
”wing it”. Six participants responded with gathering a list of possible permissions and
opening them for development. Two responded with using the group permissions instead
of individually opening each one.
Table 4.9
Planning strategy before test
Prequestion:What plan do you have for development?
Synthesised response
”Just Wing It”
Gather a master list of possible permissions to open
Use Group Permissions

Fequency/Percentage
3/27%
6/55%
2/18%

The first group of participants had planned on coding the application and enabling
what they needed when they needed it. This process lent itself to the possibility of having the fewest possible permissions set for the application. However, there is no way to
know certainly that it is the fewest number without some way to reevaluate and rework
the permissions. The second group proposed to go through and get one master list of all
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permissions that could possibly be used and open them. There was no plan given by these
participants to remove permissions later that were not currently being used. This would result in an application with many open permissions many of which would not be used. The
last group planned on using the group permissions. The reasoning is that group permissions generalized different permissions together and resulted in fewer permissions being
set. As explained earlier, while the developer has to make fewer calls to the group permissions, there are not fewer permissions set. It opens a whole group of permissions even if
they are not all being used.
The participants had enough information to make the general decisions for preplanning
but none of their strategies could guarantee minimal usage of permissions. After the initial
planning, the SADM was explained to each person. Testing began after each participant
understood how to follow the model. In the survey, each participant was able to rate how
their experience was with using the SADM for development. In question 2, the participants
rated how difficult it was to understand and follow the proposed model.
Table 4.10
Understanding and Following the SADM
Q2:How difficult is SADM to understand and follow?
Option
Not difficult
Slightly difficult
Somewhat difficult
Very difficult
Extremely difficult

Fequency/Percentage
6/55%
5/45%
0/0%
0/0%
0/0%
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Table 4.10 shows the results for question 2 of the survey. Fifty-five percent of the
participants all reported that it was not difficult at all to understand the model. Fortyfive percent of the participants reported that it was slightly difficult to understand. The
model seemed to be easy to understand and follow for development. By making it easy
to understand, it makes it easier for developers to use the model for software application
development.
The next question asked how feasible do the participants feel the SADM is for development of Android applications. This is a software development model but it specifically
targets the Android platform. Question 3 allowed the participants to address this concern.
Table 4.11 shows the responses to this question.
Table 4.11
Feasibility of the SADM
Q3:How feasible is SADM in the development of Android applications?
Option
Not feasible
Slightly feasible
Somewhat feasible
Very feasible
Extremely feasible

Fequency/Percentage
0/0%
0/0%
1/9%
8/73%
2/18%

Mostly the participants felt that it was very feasible to use the model for Android development. Nine percent felt that it was somewhat feasible; 73% felt that it was very feasible;
and 18% felt that it was extremely feasible. The ability to use the model for development is
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a major concern for any development model. By saying the SADM is very feasible to use
for development allows it to be more readily usable by developers. No correlation could
be found between how feasible it was to use the proposed model and the level of previous
Android experience the participant had. The participant who felt it was somewhat feasible
had reported none for previous experience with Android development. In contrast one of
the two participants who reported extremely feasible also had reported none for previous
experience with Android development as well.
The participants report that the proposed model is feasible to be used in Android development and is easy to understand. All software development models add steps but they
cannot be viewed has a hindrance to the process or the model will never be used. Question
4 of the survey address this concern and the results are shown in table Table 4.12.
Table 4.12
Difficulty Using the SADM
Q4:How difficult did SADM make the application development process?
Option
Not difficult
Slightly difficult
Somewhat difficult
Very difficult
Extremely difficult

Frequency/Percentage
11/100%
0/0%
0/0%
0/0%
0/0%
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All 100% of the participants reported that it added no difficulty to the development
process. Using the SADM was used and did not interfere with the participants’ ability to
develop the application during testing.
Each participant was asked to give his or her opinion on the strength and weaknesses
of proposed model. Question 7 and question 8 ask for this information and are presented
in table Table 4.13 and table Table 4.14 respectively. In these tables, each participant’s
response was condensed into a general concern. Each concern was given a response from
one participant to show how the participants responded to the question. While different
participants have different responses phrased, similar responses are condensed to a general
response.
Table 4.13
Strengths of the SADM
Q7:What strengths does the SADM have for the application
development process?
Response Summary
Understanding how to
select permissions

Frequency/Percentage
3/27%

Application built with
few permissions

7/64%

No unused permissions

1/9%

79

Sample Response
Knowledge of what certain
permissions do
The finished app will be more
appealing with fewer
permissions
Creates secure applications
without unnecessary
application permissions

Each participant responded with the strength of the SADM being how it handles permission generation. Twenty-seven percent of participants feel that the SADM provides
the developer with the ability to understand how to select the permissions. Sixty-four percent of participants reported that the strength of the SADM is applications build using this
process results in the fewest permissions needed. Nine percent of the participants felt the
strength of the model is that the resulting application had no unused permissions.
Question 8 asked the participants to describe the weakness of the proposed methodology. The results are presented in Table 4.14. Similar to table Table 4.13, each response
was group into similar categories and summarized. Each category is presented along with
a sample response that belonged to the category.
Table 4.14
Weakness of the SADM
Q8:What weaknesses does the SADM have for the application
development process?
Response Summary
none

Frequency/Percentage
4/36%

Easy to get distracted
from main development

5/46%

Intermediate steps should
test the permissions.

2/18%
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Sample Response
”None observed”
”Spent too much time over
compensating on permissions
that we would later not need”
”I think there should be some
intermediate processes to
insure necessary permissions
are present”

The participants responded with a weakness and the responses were grouped together.
Thirty-six percent of participants responded with no weaknesses. Forty-six percent of
participants felt that it was easy to get too distracted by the permissions and lose focus on
building the actual application. Eighteen percent of participants feel that iterating through
the process was extraneous. These participants suggested that having more intermediate
steps for checking the permissions would work better. Answering these questions provided
the researcher with an understanding of how well the SADM works as a development
model. The participants all responded positively with respect to using the proposed model
for future development of Android applications.

4.2.4

SADM Usage Analysis

Each participant used the SADM to develop an application from requirements to final
product. Section 4.2.2 presented the results of the application built using the proposed
methodology. While using the model allowed the participants to build applications with
minimal permissions, a development model must also be usable for the software development process. In addition to reporting on the permissions generated for the final product,
each participant also reported on their usage of the proposed model.
It is of interest to note how difficult it is by software developers to use the SADM
and how effective it is at building Android applications. The participants all reported that
the model was easy to use and useful in the development process. The SADM provided
the guidance the developers needed to understand the permission system of Android and
provided the method needed to map functional requirements to permissions. By applying
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an iterative approach to requirements mapping, the developers were able to generate a
minimal set of permissions the application needed to use. This is the biggest strength
reported by the participants the SADM gives developers. The participants all reported
using the SADM gives the developer minimal permissions to satisfy the requirements.
This is done by understanding how the permissions work and by forcing the developers to
spend time mapping requirements to permissions.
The SADM methodology is not immune to problems. The participants reported on
the weaknesses of the proposed model. Due to the nature of reworking permissions of an
application, the big weakness of the SADM is how much time is spent on just permission
mapping. Many of the participants felt it is easy to get lost in permission gathering. The
proposed model utilizes an iterative approach by reevaluating the permissions and starting back at the beginning. Iterating through the whole process many times can be time
consuming and is a weakness that can be addressed.

4.3

Main Hypothesis and Research Questions Results
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that by following the methodology modeled by

the SADM, developers will be able to produce an application with minimal permission
being used. For the test, the researcher built an application designed to send messages
between devices as well as share files between the two. By iterating through the design,
the researcher produced an application with a set of permission, such that removal of any
permission would remove functionality from the application. The requirements for this
application was given to participants to test the SADM. Every participant was able to gen82

erate a list with the exact same permissions as the one determined by the researcher. Each
participant did start with a larger permission list then what they finally ended with. By
using the SADM, each participant was able to remove useless permissions until all that remained was the minimal set needed to achieve functionality. Each participant successfully
built an application with the predetermined minimal permissions.
The surveys answered provided the researcher with information answering the research
questions asked to validate the usefulness of the SADM as a software development model.

4.3.1

Is the model easy to use?

It is reported by the participants that the model was easy to use. For any software
development model to be effective it has to be used by the developers. A model that is
easy to understand is more likely to be used by developers. Each participant felt that the
model was clear and easy to understand. The participants felt that the model was feasible
to be used for Android development and felt that it added no more difficulty to the overall
process. The model guides the developers in decomposing requirements to a base form
that can be used by a certain permission or set of permissions. The participants were able
to follow this process and not have it interfere with the development process.

4.3.2

Does the model help with determining what permissions to use ahead of time?

The SADM provided the participants with the methodology to map functional requirements to different permissions. Each participant built a list of permissions at the beginning
of development but had to reevaluate their list. Their lists were trimmed down to the appropriate permissions. This worked in context of providing the minimal set of permissions, but
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they still had a different set before development. The participants were able to map permissions to requirements. However, once the participants began implementing the application
they began to understand how some permissions were not necessary. This resulted in the
reevaluation cycle to get a new set of permissions for implementation. The SADM did
provide assistance in determining permissions ahead of time even if it was different from
the final list.

4.3.3

Does the model result in developer specified minimal permission usage?

The participants all reported the same five permissions needed for the application.
These permissions were the same ones determined prior to testing by the researcher. Each
participant reported their set of permissions determined prior to implementation and determined upon completion. Every participant needed to iterate through permission acquiring,
but they were able to end with the same five permissions expected. These permissions were
generated by the participants by using the proposed model and every application tested utilized the same minimal set of permissions.

4.3.4

Can minimal permission usage be built in from the beginning of development?

The SADM did not appear to build the minimal permission base at the very beginning
of development. While the SADM does provide the means to determine different permissions based on the functional requirements, it does not provide a way to know exactly
how the permissions will be utilized prior to implementation. Most of the participants reported little to no prior experience developing applications on Android with a few reporting
higher. The more experienced Android developers were expected to have a better under84

standing what permissions were needed prior to implementation. There was no observable
correlation between prior Android experience and the ability to determine permissions at
the beginning of development.

4.3.5

Can the model be used by someone with little to no prior experience with application development on Android?

All of the participants had experience with software development in general. Their
specific experience with Android development was scattered with most reporting little to
none. Each participant reported the ability to easily use the model to develop applications
for Android. The model guided their development process for people with no experience
with Android development. The SADM provided the mechanism to map the functional
requirements to the permissions. It was thought that participants with higher levels of
experience with Android would not follow the model as strictly. From the surveys filled
out, there is no correlation between the usability of the model between those with high
Android experience and low Android experience.

4.3.6

Research Question Summary

The surveys provided answers to the research questions and was discussed above. Table 4.15 summarizes the research questions. These research questions are listed with the
expected outcome and the actual outcome.
The table summarizes the research questions of this dissertation. The information was
gathered from the survey done post application development. The survey was compared
to the resulting list of permissions to answer the questions. The next chapter discusses the
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Table 4.15
Research Question Summary

Research Question

Is the model easy to
use?
Does the model help
with determining
what permissions to
use ahead of time?

Expected
The model will be
easy to follow and use
for development
The model will
provide a way to
determine permissions
at the beginning of
development

Result
compared to
expected

Survey
Question

Yes

Q2,Q3,Q4,Q6

Yes

Q5,Q12

Does the model result
in developer specified
minimal permission
usage?

Use of the SADM will
result in minimal
Yes
permissions

Q11

Can minimal
permission usage be
built in from the
beginning of
development?

Through proper
decomposition of
requirements the
minimal set of
permissions can be
determined at the
beginning of
development

Every
participant had
to redesign
permissions at
least once

Q12, Q9,
Comparing
initial list to
final list

The model can be
used by anyone
regardless of prior
Android experience

Yes

Q1, Q4

Developers with less
experience will have
an easier time using
the model

Every
participant had
easy time with
model

Q1, Q4

Can the model be used
by someone with little
to no prior experience
with application
development on
Android?
Does the amount of
previous experience
have an affect on
usage of the proposed
model?
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conclusions drawn from this experiment as well as future work where the weaknesses of
the SADM are addressed.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

This chapter presents conclusions based on the analysis of the resulting information
gathered from the experiment. Contributions of the defined model along with an avenue
for future research are discussed in this chapter.

5.1

Contribution
The Secure Android Development Model (SADM) proposed in this dissertation pro-

vides a methodology to developers that restricts the usage of permissions in Android applications. Review of the literature revealed that attempts at Android security focused on
protecting devices from applications installed. These applications are both intentionally
malicious and non-malicious. The non-malicious applications tend to be faulty and poorly
designed allowing for exploitation by other applications. The proposed model attempts to
solve the problem of poorly designed applications being exploited by removing exploitation avenues during development.
After development of the proposed model, the researcher began by conducting a preliminary case study for verification of the model. This was accomplished by examining
twenty different applications from the Android app store all of which had similar functionality. The applications chosen were a group of file sharing and messaging apps. From these
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apps, the researcher gathered a list of commonly used permissions and classified them into
used ones and unused ones. After classification of permissions, the researcher began development of an application which allowed for messaging and file sharing using the same
permissions used by these other applications. Following the model, the researcher was able
to reduce the permissions down to a select group. Removal of any permission would break
functionality of the application.
The created application became the control for participants testing the model. Upon
completion and verification, the researcher gathered 11 volunteers and provided the requirements for the application. The participants were then given the development model
and a lecture to its meaning and workings. The participants were given a survey upon completion of the application. Each participant provide a list of initial permissions and final
permissions along with the completed survey to the researcher. It was shown that by using
the development model and iterating through it at least once, each participant was able to
build the application with the same set of final permissions as the researcher. Analysis of
the model itself was performed from the information provided by the surveys to validate
the usefulness of the SADM as a software development model.
The SADM contributes to the field of information security because it is a development
model focused on minimizing permission usage. While plugins have been built to assist
developers in selecting permissions[32], they are insufficient in providing the necessary
capabilities of the designer to reevaluate which permissions are needed. Developers relied
on guessing what permissions they would need for development. This led to grabbing many
different permissions if there was a small chance it would be needed. Utilizing the SADM
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allowed the participants to develop the application and work through which permissions
are necessary and eliminating the ones that are not.

5.2

Publication Plan
The following paper from this work have been submitted for peer review: Refereed

Conference:
C. Ivancic and D. Dampier, ”A Developer’s Guide to Android Security: Building Security in Your Apps”. To be reviewed at the 24th International Conference on Software
Engineering and Data Engineering (SEDE) 2015.
The following paper is planned to be submitted for journal publication Refereed Journal:
C. Ivancic and D. Dampier, ”Secure Android Development: A Methodology for Building Security into Your Android Applications”. Will be submitted to Pervasive Mobile
Computing special issue on Mobile Security, Privacy and Forensics.

5.3

Future Research
Through testing it was discovered that the developers can spend much of their time

reevaluating the permissions. The iteration process takes the developers back through the
development cycle starting at the beginning with mapping requirements to permissions.
This resulted in some participants feeling that too much time was spent cycling through
the model many times. One potential solution to this problem is to modify the model
implementation to allow for more rapid redesigning of the permissions during the implementation phase. Research can be done by modifying the existing model implementation
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and running tests again attempting to determine how much less time is spent by not having
to repeat the whole process again.
The proposed methodology is implemented as a model designed specifically for the
Android platform. Each smartphone OS has its own implementation of permissions and
application interaction. The idea of using permissions to allow for applications to communicate is used in many different; however, it is different for each OS. Research can be
done to build upon the existing model to allow for a more generalized model. The idea of
designing the model to be more generalized is to allow for a standard methodology to be
used by developer of any mobile device OS.
For this dissertation, each participant was asked for his or her previous experience with
Android development. No significant difference was observed from the results of those
with high experience in Android programming versus those with low to none. For the
most part, the participants report a low to no level of previous experience programming
apps for Android. A test can be designed to test groups of developers with high experience
with Android and test groups with low level of Android programming. A comparison of
these results will give more insight as to the effectiveness of the model given a previous
level of Android experience.
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<? xml v e r s i o n =” 1 . 0 ” e n c o d i n g =”UTF−8” ?>
−<m a n i f e s t p a c k a g e =” c a s e T e s t . a n d r o i d f i l e t r a n s f e r ”
x m l n s : a n d r o i d =” h t t p : / / s c h e m a s . a n d r o i d . com / apk / r e s / a n d r o i d
”>
<u s e s −s d k a n d r o i d : m i n S d k V e r s i o n =” 14 ” />
<u s e s −p e r m i s s i o n a n d r o i d : n a m e =” a n d r o i d . p e r m i s s i o n .
ACCESS WIFI STATE ” />
<u s e s −p e r m i s s i o n a n d r o i d : n a m e =” a n d r o i d . p e r m i s s i o n .
CHANGE WIFI STATE” />
<u s e s −p e r m i s s i o n a n d r o i d : n a m e =” a n d r o i d . p e r m i s s i o n .
INTERNET” />
<u s e s −p e r m i s s i o n a n d r o i d : n a m e =” a n d r o i d . p e r m i s s i o n .
READ EXTERNAL STORAGE” />
<u s e s −p e r m i s s i o n a n d r o i d : n a m e =” a n d r o i d . p e r m i s s i o n .
WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE” />
−< a p p l i c a t i o n a n d r o i d : t h e m e =” @ s t y l e / AppTheme ”
a n d r o i d : l a b e l =” @ s t r i n g / app name ” a n d r o i d : i c o n =”
@drawable / i c l a u n c h e r ” a n d r o i d : a l l o w B a c k u p =” t r u e ”
>
−< a c t i v i t y a n d r o i d : n a m e =” c a s e T e s t .
a n d r o i d f i l e t r a n s f e r . MainActivity ”
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a n d r o i d : l a b e l =” @ s t r i n g / app name ”
a n d r o i d : s c r e e n O r i e n t a t i o n =” p o r t r a i t ”>
−< i n t e n t − f i l t e r >
< a c t i o n a n d r o i d : n a m e =”
android . i n t e n t . action .
MAIN” />
<c a t e g o r y a n d r o i d : n a m e =”
android . i n t e n t . category .
LAUNCHER” />
</ i n t e n t − f i l t e r>
< / a c t i v i t y>
< a c t i v i t y a n d r o i d : n a m e =” c a s e T e s t . a n d r o i d f i l e t r a n s f e r .
B r o a d c a s t A c t i v i t y ” a n d r o i d : l a b e l =” @ s t r i n g /
t i t l e a c t i v i t y b r o a d c a s t ” a n d r o i d : s c r e e n O r i e n t a t i o n =”
p o r t r a i t ”> < / a c t i v i t y>
< a c t i v i t y a n d r o i d : n a m e =” c a s e T e s t . a n d r o i d f i l e t r a n s f e r .
S e r v e r A c t i v i t y ” a n d r o i d : l a b e l =” @ s t r i n g /
t i t l e a c t i v i t y s e r v e r ” a n d r o i d : s c r e e n O r i e n t a t i o n =”
p o r t r a i t ”> < / a c t i v i t y>
< a c t i v i t y a n d r o i d : n a m e =” c a s e T e s t . a n d r o i d f i l e t r a n s f e r .
C l i e n t A c t i v i t y ” a n d r o i d : l a b e l =” @ s t r i n g /
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t i t l e a c t i v i t y c l i e n t ” a n d r o i d : s c r e e n O r i e n t a t i o n =”
p o r t r a i t ”> < / a c t i v i t y>
< / a p p l i c a t i o n>
< / m a n i f e s t>
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